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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an initial appeal of a district court civil judgment, pursuant to section 
78a-2a-3 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. It has been assigned by the Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in preventing the 
defendant from presenting evidence on the claim of a breached contract. 
2. The trial court should have awarded a value consistent with the property being 
zoned as a salvage yard. 
3. The trial court should have awarded damage for the loss of a sign site and the 
destruction of the sign. 
4. The trial court should have awarded severance damages because of the loss of 
use in the severed piece as a salvage yard. 
5. The court should have awarded damages for future flooding. 
6. The trial court should have awarded interest on the judgment from the date of 
the taking. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review for excluded evidence is that deference will be given to 
the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Carpet Barn v Department 
of Transportation, 786 P2d 770 (Utah App. 1990) 
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2. The standard of review of summary judgment is no deference is given to the 
trial court's application of the law. The appellate court is to only consider evidence that is 
undisputed. Facts are to be resolved in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party. 
Sorenson v Beers, 585 P2d 458 (Utah 1978) 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Utah Constitution provides at Article I, section 22, "private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This an action for eminent domain filed by Riverdale City (hereinafter referred to 
as Riverdale or the City,) against Crabtree Auto Company (hereinafter referred to as Crabtree.) On 
May 20, 1983 the parties and others engaged in a transfer of certain parcels of land to allow an 
initial extension of 700 West and the construction of a bridge across the Weber River to the new 
Riverdale City offices, (see Illustration I at page 7) The agreement provided a site plan for 
Crabtree to move their salvage operation to the east and the construction of a new facility. As a 
part of the transaction Crabtree retained the property that the City condemned in the present 
action. 
The City filed for and was granted immediate possession. Crabtree contested the 
public purpose of the taking so the funds were not taken until after the court's final judgment was 
entered. The City made a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Crabtree's claim of 
breach of contract. The court ruled in favor of the City. (A copy is attached in the Appendix.) 
-5-
A trial was had on the issues of public purpose and just compensation. Both sides 
presented expert testimony on the issues of value both for the parcel taken and on severance 
damages and destruction of property. The court found the property was taken for a public purpose 
and established an amount as just compensation. (A copy of the judgment is attached to the 
Appendix.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in granting partial summary judgment and not allowing 
Crabtree to present evidence of damage from the prior contract and evidence of damage on their 
counterclaim. 
The court further erred as follows: 
a. in not finding adequate value of the property taken; 
b. in not assigning a value to the lost sign site; 
b. in not awarding severance damages; 
c. in not awarding damage for the wall and the sign; 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF THE CONTRACT 
CRABTREE AUTO SALVAGE 
OPERATION 
WALL 
[To City Offices| 4 6 " 0 South 
Catch basin 
Dusty's Dealership 
CONDEMNED PROPERTY 
nHpMNf 
Other Crabtree 
property 
JL^JSSESL. 
Sign 
SEVERED 
PROPERTY 
Other Crabtree 
property 
700 
West 
Illustration I 
The trial court erred in granting Riverdale's motion for partial summary judgment. 
The contract previously entered by the parties gave Crabtree the parcel of ground taken in the 
condemnation. Riverdale by negotiation obtained a right of way for access to the new city offices. 
Crabtree received as consideration for the transfer including a lot, waiver of building permit fees, 
rezoning to allow for his salvage operation and retention of the condemned parcel. 
The contract accepted Crabtree's site plan. Paragraph 24 and 25 respectively 
provide as follows: 
24. The parties hereto agree that this Agreement shall be deemed to 
contain all of the terms and conditions agreed upon, it being understood 
that there are no outside conditions, representations, warranties or other 
agreements, written, oral or implied. 
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25. The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall not be altered 
in any manner whatsoever except by a subsequent written supplemental 
agreement executed by all of the parties hereto. 
Paragraph 16 adopts the site plan of Crabtree. The site plan is important because it 
retains in Crabtree's control the strip of land ultimately condemned. The value of this parcel that 
controls development of property to the rear is high. This strip controlled access to Riverdale 
Road on 700 West. Paragraph 25 clearly provides that an alteration of the agreement can not take 
place without a new agreement executed in writing. It is acknowledged that the general rule is that 
the City cannot negotiate away its right to condemn. Eminent Domain, 26 Am Jur 2d Section 17 
page 658. However what the City did should be considered in determining the value of the parcel. 
This is not the usual condemnation where a municipality finds a parcel of ground 
necessary for a public purpose and then seeks to establish the fair value of the property. In this 
case the City has provided the best evidence of real value by the land trade it engineered to obtain 
4600 South. Evidence of that value should have been admissible in this case. (Transcript page 
129 to page 133) The City has been an active manipulator of the value of this property, both by its 
own acquisition of adjoining parcels and the previous agreement it entered with Crabtree. 
However, it is unjust for the City to negotiate to obtain one position and then better 
its position by use of eminent domain. Such negotiating tactics are not in good faith. Even though 
the City cannot negotiate away its right to condemn the consideration received by Crabtree in the 
prior contract roadway property should be heard in this case on the issue of value of the parcel 
taken. The City has used its police power to change a contract and has used eminent domain to 
change the bargained for value. The use of the police power results in a compensable injury. 
Road Commission v Miya, 526 P2d 926 (Utah 1974) provides, "where a police 
power is exercised as an incidental result of the exercise of eminent domain, just compensation is 
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due if the market value of the property has been diminished " In this case the market value has 
been diminished 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY TAKEN AS PART OF AN AUTO SALVAGE OPERATION 
The Utah Constitution provides at Article I, section 22, "private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation " The property in this case has a 
uniqueness endowed on it because of its zone and the ability of Crabtree to carry on a salvage 
business As part of the contract between the City and Crabtree the parties agreed to a rezoning of 
Crabtree to allow the move of their salvage yard (Transcnpt page 114 line 18-23 ) In the last 13 
or 14 years there has been one salvage yard moved and no new operations opened (Transcnpt 
page 114 line 24 to page 116 line 2 
There is a uniqueness to salvage yard property because cities and counties have 
historically not allowed them within their boundanes The municipalities of Weber County have 
prevented any new operations in the last decade One operation was allowed to move from Roy 
City to Weber County 13 years ago (Transcnpt page 115) Auto recycling or salvage operations 
have not been able to acquire new land for their operations Crabtree obtained its special zoning 
designation by negotiation in the pnor descnbed agreement with the City The right to use this 
land for a umque purpose is important to determining the value of the property 
The Utah Supreme Court said in Utah State Road Commission v Frib erg, 687 P2d 
821 (Utah 1984), "For compensation to be fair and just, it must reflect the fair value of the land to 
the landowner " The Court went on to quote from State v Noble, 305 P2d 495, 497 (Utah 1956), 
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"Just compensation means that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as they 
would have occupied had their property not been taken." 
The experts for the parties used essentially the same comparables to determine 
value. The City's expert used a value of $3.00 a square foot as the value of the property. 
(Transcript page 160.) Crabtree's expert used $4.50 a square foot as the value he found. 
(Transcript page 50.) The difference is the $10,000 value ascribed to the taken property by the 
City and the $15,500 value ascribed by Crabtree. 
The logic of the Crabtree's expert was the value should be on the higher end of the 
range because the property was zoned for junk yards. The City's expert did not have the 
knowledge that the property was zoned for salvage operations. (Transcript page 164.) It is 
understandable that this information was not conveyed to the City's expert in that he accomplished 
his appraisal near the time of the taking in 1988. At that time the property had not been rezoned as 
agreed by the City in their prior contract. (Transcript page 114) The City performed the actual 
rezone after the institution of this law suit when Crabtree pointed out the City's neglect. 
The court should have considered the special zoning of this property and awarded 
damages for the taking in accord with the testimony of Crabtree's expert. 
POINT THREE 
THE REMAINING PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED DEPRECIATED 
BECAUSE IT HAS LOST ITS USE AS AN AUTO SALVAGE YARD 
The severance of the property prevents the remaining ground west of the new road 
way from being used as a part of the salvage yard. Severance damage has been defined as, "those 
caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of 
the improvement on that part causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken." Utah 
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Department of Transportation v „'Ambrosia, '43 P2J 1220, 1222 (I 'ia/i IVS~) The City's expert 
correctly points out the severed parcel can not be used for a salvage yard because it is tc c si i tall,, 
( I 'ransci ipt page 164 lii i t 2 4) Fhe difficulty for this position is that it was formerly attached to a 
major salvage operation and was part, of the future expansion of Crabtree. It had previously the 
east end * S" • »<» -er square 
foot oi more likely the salvage yard value of ( lahtree s expert oi S4 ^0 per squate toot 
Both experts agreed the best use of the severed, p u , - . • v as as 
parkii IJ ;. I he City's expert argued this was its best use before the taking and theretbre mere had 
been no effect on the value oi ttu severed parcel (Transcript pane ' R^ rvahtree's expert testified 
. ., . ,,.\ ^ * fference between 
ais value of $4.50 per square foot and the reduced \alue oi Si i»*> ;vi square lo*^ i was the 
severance damage. The court erred in not finding a severance damage. 
The City used its police power to prevent Crabtree from using the severed portion 
either to store cars or to park cars. (Transcript page 120 to page P 1 x The use as a parking lot is 
ya, J26P2CI 926 (Utah 
1974) 
The reduction in size severely limits llic IIM* ol (IK: MI ui MI p;m el Hie < 'ilv's 
expert correctly states it can no longer be used as a part' of the salvage operation. I he court, should 
have awarded $11,800 in severance damages. Even accepting the <~W* value of $3.00 a square 
mm Irion IIK I ml nun llu n i llu tlitlctntitv m paikiup use of $l.ou a square foot. The City's 
appraiser gave m _.;d^ ' W ^ - alue tor parking. Using his $3.00 value and. the $1.40 for parking 
there is still a severance damage * ><- ^. 
.11. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE LOSS OF THE SIGN SITE 
The parcel taken is uniquely situated just south of the Riverdale Road - 700 West 
intersection. It was appropriately used as an advertising sign site for the auto salvage operation. 
Because it was at the end of 700 West it was visible from Riverdale Road. A sign on the 
remaining property is not of the same quality because it would have to be of a height sufficient to 
top the buildings on Riverdale Road to be visible. 
Crabtree's appraiser found a value of the sign site of $6,500. (Transcript page 55) 
The sign site adds an additional value to the property. The sign does not interfere in other uses of 
the property but does enhance the value of the location. It is the loss of a valuable property right. 
It is certainly not any less of a loss than the loss of traditional parking places found in Three D 
Corporation v Salt Lake City, 752 P2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988) The Court of Appeals said "there is 
little question but that the City's action has substantially impaired appellant's long-standing right to 
utilize their property for storefront parking and has caused them direct, pecuniary injury." 
POINT FIVE 
INTEREST ON THE COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
HAD FROM THE DATE OF TAKING. 
Interest on the just compensation should have been awarded from the date of 
taking. Crabtree could not take the funds paid as a bond into court without losing the right to 
contest the public purpose of the taking. The property was taken in October of 1988. (Transcript 
page 149 line 20.) The Supreme Court has considered whether the date of taking should be 
considered when long delays in coming to trial are occasioned. The Court has found this to be a 
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factor for consideration in determining the valuation of appreciating property, see Utah State 
Road'Commiwinn v Friheni 6.s . _.<i '*•. < ' .,;•; ' 
The reason for delay of trial was not the choice of Crabtree. I he right to damages 
are deemed to have accrued at the time of taking. \ ICA 78-34-11. Crabtree has been placed in the 
positioi i tl lat tl !€;; <r cai 11 lot accept the fi n ids v • itl ten it giv ii t.g I ip tl ne i igl it to contest the public 
purpose. I he delay of the trial from the fall of 1988 until the spring of 1993 was not the doing of 
Crabtree nor the City. Crabtree has not aski * -i :1 lei e was 
indication that there has been more activity recently in this kind of proper!).
 v i ranseript page 157) 
The proper solution is to award interest on the judgment at the then existing judgment rate of I i 
POINT SIX 
THE C O U R T SHOULD HAVE A W A R D E D DAMAGE FOR THE LOSS 
OF Tl IE W \I I \ N I ) fi IE 1 .OSS OF Tl IE SIGN 
rhere was a cement waii that t iu\ersed the taken parcel and extended to the 
remaining parcel on either side. Riverdale's appraiser amended his initial appraisal by the value of 
I he wiill ! ['KIIIM i ipl pit,!'1,!11 ii|"s") CtTtbtfiv's c x p n l ascribed a value to this improvement on the land 
of $53 per running foot or $21,.200 for the full wall. I he City's engineers have required that the 
lull wall be torn, down ( I 'i ansci ipt Page h I I ai id Exhibit 11) 
Crabtree had an existing sign on uiw
 r - ~ r ~ -. ^'as largely destroyed in 
construction and rendered useless. The value of the sign was $J,NH> (Tcmscripl page I 11 :: I The 
• tent. 1 1 ie sign was ruined in by the removal and 
partial burial by the City's construction. 
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POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FORESEEABLE EFFECT 
OF WATER DAMAGE FROM THE CONDEMNATION 
Riverdale City ran a storm sewer through the condemned parcel. The storm sewer 
drains newly developed ground behind Crabtree and delivers the water through a new connection 
onto 4600 South. The water collects at a basin in front of Crabtree. The elevation of the storm 
sewer and its size is such that in wet years it can not drain the excess water into the river but 
instead delivers the water into Crabtree's business. The trial court heard the evidence under a 
continuing objection from counsel for the City. Ultimately the trial court struck the testimony. 
(Transcript page 103 - page 113.) 
Dahl Crabtree testified that the construction of the storm drain did not take into 
account the elevation of his business and the height of the bridge across the Weber River to the 
new City offices. Dahl Crabtree testified he has been flooded twice in the 80fs. (Transcript page 
128) The damages from flooding were $35,000. (Transcript page 127) The court ultimately 
disallowed the evidence on flooding damages. The City cannot construct improvements such as 
storm drains through the condemned property without consideration for the reasonably likely 
consequences of their acts. Department of Transportation v Jones, 694 P2d 1033. 
The problem has not been as apparent since the taking and the construction of the 
storm drain because the region has been in a drought period. But as certain as the floods of the 
past Utah will again cycle through a wet period. It is not unreasonable to expect that the next 
decade will again hold at least one season of flooding as it has averaged in the past. The 
anticipated damage is likely to be that of the past. The City should pay for the reasonable damage. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's errors should be corrected 
should be changed to allow as follows: 
$ 15,500 as the value of the property taken 
$ 
$21,200 as the value of the w all. 
$3,500 as the value of the destroyed sign. 
$6,500 as the value of the sign site. 
$22,000 as the present value of water damage in the next decade 
< 11 m 11,;,! i icnt reversed that they may 
place evidence before the court as to the value received in the prior" transaction where Riverdale 
City acquired the right to construct 4600 Soi it! i. 1 1 lis ev iciei ice of bread i : >f tl i i prior agreei i lei it is 
necessary. Even if the City cannot negotiate away its right to condemn its failure to honor its 
agreement should be an element of damage. The court should not have treated this case as strictly 
i n uniti'i 11 ill 11 I 1111 in I pi i M if i I 11 mi i I! lit |!iii'iiii ilmliMi's of the parties should have been considered. Fhe 
good faith of the City in seeking condemnation after ilegotiating vvhat seems to be a limitation of 
the use of that power should be eoiisidnal 
Respectfully submitted, 
Donak 
Attorney for Defendant/^pellant 
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RIVERDALE CITY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIVERDALE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaint i f f , 
JUDGMENT OF JUST 
COMPENSATION 
v. 
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-354688 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Court on November 9, 1992, the Plaintiff being present and 
represented by Douglas J. Holmes, Esq., Riverdale City 
Attorney and Harold A. Hintze, Esq., and the Defendants being 
present and represented by Donald C. Hughes, Esq., the Court 
having heard the testimony and reviewed the exhibits presented 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
q 1 1 : 30 A , in, , 1 he Plaintiff beir. - entea >. . ' ilas Holmes, 
inM?s'l ,'"1 llii'H'l A. Hint^'j ^ ^ " ' r • *:her 
1111 appearing nor being represent .. g 
at sn i i tri.i I. and having tal* '" ' * •*••••.-> advisement, 
and having ">^  considered d 
its MEMORANDUM DECISION on December • tnf • .ter 
til"1!"! i "'Hi" l'.i"lr bofovr' i-|'f ' •* ••- • -p*-t's 
MEMORANDUM L)LCI Si UN and nu'i I f 
heard the testimony of an engineer concer; .. 'ie costs of 
131 
12 
i > I.I , i I i 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20| 
21 
221 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
extension; the Couit being i . . 
good cause appearing therefoi . .. -?v * r ' JUDGMENT 
i I I , I ' 
1. The property herein sought to be acquired by eminent 
domain is one authorized by law and the acquisition is for a 
PU I I'M*.. 
2. The- property boing acquired is approximately 
3,302, l1 sq ft in size, and had a fair market value on the 
d a t e i I lil I 111 111111. 
3. Tlit Defendant is not entitled to severance **™=»yo<2 
as a result of I his rondemnat >• -?r damages aris: u 
therefrom, ol Iw i I I>.i i| 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
101 
11 
12! 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
251 
26 
2 7 J 
28 
previously traversed the property being acquired and was cut 
to accommodate the road extension. The Court finds that the 
cost to brace said wall is the sum of $600. 
4. Defendant is therefore entitled to a JUDGMENT OF 
JUST COMPENSATION for the property taken and all of the 
damages associated with the take as follows: 
(a) $10,000 for the property taken; 
(b) $600 for damages to the existing wall; 
for a total sum of $10,600. The Clerk of the Court is hereby 
directed to return to Plaintiff the $13,875 deposited pursuant 
to the ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY issued herein on June 20, 
1989 and all accrued interest thereof, less Court 
administrative expenses, for use by the Plaintiff to satisfy 
the Judgment entered herein with all excess funds to remain 
the exclusive property of the Plaintiff. 
5. Upon payment in full of said JUDGMENT OF JUST 
COMPENSATION, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to entry of a 
FINAL ORDER OF CONDEMNATION vesting title to the subject 
property, by eminent domain, in the Plaintiff. 
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MADE AND ENTERED this day of April, 1993 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael D. Lyon 
District Court Judge 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Donald C. Hughes 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIVERDALE ci'ry, a municipal 
corporat ion, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
CRABTREE AUTO COMPANY, et al.f 
Defendant• 
i 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No* 880903546 
Defendant filed answer to counter-claim alleging that the 
plaintiff Riverdale City previously entered into a contract with 
the defendant for the trade and purchase of certain properties 
adjacent to the property to be condemned and that as a term of 
that agreement plaintiff agreed not to take the described 
property without consent of the defendant and further that the 
plaintiff had breached the prior agreement. 
The agreement between plaintiff and defendant is an 
integrated contract. Paragraphs 24 and 25 contained the merger 
or integration clause. 
Defendant claims that paragraph 16 of the referred to 
contract requires a determination what constituted the "Crabtree 
Site Development Plan", as an issue of fact yet to be resolved* 
Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Case No. 880903546 
Page 2 
The referral to the proposed site development plan is 
mentioned in paragraph 16 as having been approved but no way can 
it be interpreted to mean that, that reference places plaintiff 
in a position that they cannot condemn the property without the 
consent of the defendant* 
The land exchange contract is a fully integrated contract 
and contains no agreement that prohibits Riverdale city from 
condemning the subject property. Plaintiff's motion requesting 
summary judgment dismissing defendant's counter-claim alleging 
breach of agreement not to condemn is granted. 
DATED this c& V day of April 1991. 
RONALD O. HYb¥, J&d#eP\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <0^ day of April 1991, 
I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial summary Judgment to counsel as 
follows: 
Harold A, Hintze 
525 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Donald C. Hughes 
520-26th Street, Suite 2006 
Ogden, utah 84401 
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II SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE VALUE OF THE REMAINDER TRACT, 
2I PARTICULARLY IF THE REDUCTION TRANSFORMS THE REMAINDER 
3I PROPERTY INTO A NON CONFORMING USE UNDER APPLICABLE LAND USE 
4I REGULATIONS. A TAKING COULD REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE TRACT 
51 BELOW THE MINIMUM AREA REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE REGULATIONS OR 
61 THE REMAINING AMOUNT OF FRONTAGE, DEPTH OR WIDTH COULD FALL 
71 BELOW THE-MINIMUM REQUIRED. IF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS 
81 IMPROVED, THE TAKING MAY RESULT IN INADEQUATE FRONT, SIDE OR 
91 REAR YARD SETBACKS. A TAKING COULD ALSO CREATE NONCONFORMITY 
10I IN THE AMOUNT OF OFF-STREET PARKING REQUIRED OR LEAVE A 
111 REMAINDER WITH TOO HIGH A RATIO OF BUILDING TO LAND AREA. IF 
12I ANY OF THESE CONDITIONS ARE FOUND TO EXIST, THE EFFECT OF THE 
13I NONCONFORMITY MUST BE DETERMINED. END OF QUOTE. 
141 MY CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE REMAINDER PROPERTY OR PROPERTY 
151 THAT WAS SEVERED IN THE TRACT THAT WAS TAKEN AS PART OF THE 
161 CONDEMNATION CLEARLY MEETS THIS BEFORE-MENTIONED CRITERIA. 
17I Q HAS THE VALUE BEEN DIMINISHED? 
18 A YES. 
19I Q WERE YOU ABLE TO DETERMINE A SQUARE FOOTAGE VALUE OF THE 
201 REMAINING PROPERTY? 
21I A I WAS. 
22 Q AND HOW DID YOU DO THAT? WHAT DID YOU REACH? 
23| A USING MY ESTIMATION OF $4.50 PER SQUARE FOOT FOR THE 
24 
25 
ENTIRE TRACT, ONCE THE PROPERTY WAS SEVERED AND SEVERELY 
LIMITING THE USE OF THE SEVERED PROPERTY, IN MY ESTIMATION, 
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A YES. 
MR. HUGHES: THAT'S ALL. 
MR. HINTZE: NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MAY STEP DOWN. ANY OBJECTION 
IF THIS WITNESS IS EXCUSED? 
MR. HINTZE: I HAVE NONE. 
MR. HUGHES: I DON'T EITHER. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
THE WITNESS: THANK YOU. 
MR. HUGHES: I ALSO DON'T OBJECT IF HE STAYS IN THE 
COURTROOM, I DON'T ANTICIPATE RECALLING HIM. I DON'T KNOW IF 
COUNSEL WILL. I DON'T KNOW IF HE -- MR. JOHNSON HAS EXPRESSED 
SOME INTEREST IN SEEING WHAT HAPPENS HERE. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION, COUNSEL? 
MR. HINTZE: ONLY THAT HE'S PRECLUDED FROM GETTING 
BACK ON THE WITNESS STAND IF HE STAYS IN THE COURTROOM. 
MR. HUGHES: WELL, I DON'T ANTICIPATE HIM IN 
REBUTTAL, BUT JUST BUT JUST IN CASE WE BETTER HAVE HIM 
EXCLUDED. I'D CALL MARTIN MOORE TO THE STAND. HE'S IN THE 
HALL. 
MARTIN MOORE, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HUGHES: 
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II Q MARTIN, WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
A MARTIN B. MOORE, JUNIOR. 
Q AND HOW ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
A I'M A PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR, PRESIDENT OF 
MOUNTAINWEST LAND SURVEYORS IN ROY. 
Q AND WHAT — COULD YOU GIVE US A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF YOUR 
EDUCATION-AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE? 
A I'VE BEEN A SURVEYOR FOR 41 YEARS. I'VE GOT MOSTLY 
SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS, BUT I HAVE ATTENDED TEXAS INSTITUTE OF 
10I TECHNOLOGY IN MATH BACK IN THE SIXTIES. I'VE SERVED AS STATE 
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CHAIRMAN FOR THE UTAH COUNCIL OF LAND SURVEYORS FOR TWO YEARS. 
I'VE BEEN ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR SCHOOL SURVEYING FOR 
TWO DIFFERENT SCHOOLS. I TAUGHT SURVEYING AT WEBER STATE. 
I'M STILL A GUEST LECTURER ONCE A YEAR AT WEBER STATE. IT'S A 
CONTINUING EDUCATION THING. 41 YEARS COVERS A LOT OF GROUND. 
Q YOU'VE BEEN ASKED TO DO SOME SURVEYING FOR THE CRABTREES 
ON SOME GROUND ON 700 WEST, IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND I KNOW YOU HAVE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE SURVEYING AND I 
KNOW YOU'RE GOING TO BE A WITNESS IN ANOTHER CASE THAT DEALS 
21I EXTENSIVELY WITH US, BUT WHAT WE'RE LOOKING AT HERE TODAY IS 
PARTICULAR ITEMS, ONE OF WHICH IS THE WIDTH OF THIS ROAD THAT 
IS A 66 FEET WIDE ROAD. HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SURVEY 
THE GROUND THAT'S ACTUALLY BEEN TAKEN BY THE CITY AND HOW THAT 
SITS ON THE GROUND? 
22 
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A WE RAN A TOPOGRAPHICAL SURVEY, IF THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE 
REFERRING TO. 
Q IS THAT WHAT YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU THERE? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q MAYBE I COULD HAVE THAT MARKED SO -- JUST SO THAT WE CAN 
PROPERLY IDENTIFY IT. WHILE HE'S DOING THAT, DID YOU 
DETERMINE IF THERE IS MORE THAN 66 FEET THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN 
THE WAY THE ROAD IS SITUATED ON THE GROUND? 
A NO, I DIDN'T. I WAS NOT ASKED TO DO THAT SO I REALLY 
DIDN'T. 
Q DID YOU MEASURE THE WIDTH OF THE SIDEWALK? 
A YES. IT'S -- I'M NOT SURE. IT'S ON THE MAP, BUT WE DID. 
WE TOOK ELEVATIONS ON THE EDGE OF BOTH SIDEWALKS, ON THE 
OUTSIDE EDGES. 
Q OKAY. WE'LL GET TO THAT. IS IT A STANDARD FOUR-FOOT 
SIDEWALK? 
A I BELIEVE THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. LET ME SHOW YOU ON THE ELEVATION, I'VE ASKED YOU 
TO RUN ELEVATIONS ACROSS 400 -- ACROSS THIS STRETCH DOWN HERE? 
A YES. 
Q YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH WHERE THE STORM SEWER IS --
A YES. 
Q -- AREN'T YOU? DID YOU MEASURE TRACKING THAT DOWN? 
A YES, WE HAVE ELEVATIONS FOR THE — 
(WHEREUPON THE REPORTER ASKED THE WITNESS 
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ll TO SPEAK SLOWER.) 
21 Q SPEAKING OF THIS PROPERTY BOUNDARY YOU SAY -- GO AHEAD 
3I AND TELL ME WHAT YOU DID. 
41 A WE TIED DOWN THE CATCH BASIN FOR ELEVATION FLOW LINE, THE 
5I TOP -- THE TOP BACK OF THE CURB, THE FLOW LINE OF THE CURB, 
61 THE EDGE OF THE SIDEWALK, AND THE SURROUNDING FEATURES, 
71 INCLUDING THE BASE OF THE BOTTOM GIRDERS OF THE BRIDGE AND THE 
81 EMBANKMENT THAT'S BUILT ALONG THE RIVER. 
LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT I'VE HAD MARKED AS EXHIBIT NUMBER --
NUMBER 5. IS THAT A -- DOES THAT REPRESENT THE RESULT OF WHAT 
YOU DID? 
YES, IT DOES. 
CAN YOU TELL ME HOW TO READ THE ELEVATION OFF OF THAT? 
THE LOWER NUMBER IS A LOWER ELEVATION. HIGHER NUMBER IS 
THE HIGHER ELEVATION. 
OKAY. YOU'VE MEASURED THE ACTUAL CATCH BASINS? 
YES. 
MEASURED THE TOP OF OR BOTTOM OF THE BRIDGE? 
YES. 
AND THOSE ARE ALL DESIGNATED ON THERE? 
YES, THEY ARE. 
CAN YOU TELL WHICH WAY IS DOWNHILL FROM THE WAY THAT 
231 WATER IS GOING TO HAVE TO FLOW? 
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Q 
24 A WATER ACCUMULATES AT THE AREA OF THE CATCH BASINS, AND 
THEN DROPS INTO THE PIPE THAT GOES INTO THE RIVER. 
107 
Q OKAY. AND IS THE ELEVATION OF THAT PIPE HIGHER OR LOWER 
THAN CRABTREES' BUILDING? 
MR. HINTZE: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. IRRELEVANT AND 
IMMATERIAL TO THIS LAWSUIT. HAS NO BEARING ON THIS LAWSUIT 
WHATSOEVER. 
THE COURT: HOW DO I KNOW THAT, COUNSEL? 
MR. HINTZE: BECAUSE THE — ISSUE ISN'T LOCATED DOWN 
HERE. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE ACQUIRING AND PAYING THE 
COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKE OF THIS PARTICULAR PIECE OF 
PROPERTY. SOMETHING OCCURRING DOWN HERE HAS ABSOLUTELY 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CONDEMNATION. 
MR. HUGHES: WHAT THE CITY DID, WHERE WE'RE GOING 
WITH THIS IS THAT THEY'VE PAVED ACRES OF GROUND BEHIND HIM AND 
THEY'VE TAKEN ALL THAT WATER — THAT'S WHY I ASKED HIM IF HE 
TRACKED THE STORM SEWER. THE STORM SEWER RUNS RIGHT THROUGH 
THIS PARCEL OF GROUND AND PUTS IT RIGHT INTO THIS CATCH BASIN 
THAT --
THE COURT: STEP TO THE BOARD PLEASE AND SHOW ME 
WHERE YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT. 
MR. HUGHES: ALL RIGHT. ALL OF THIS GROUND HERE 
BEFORE DUSTY'S WENT IN WAS AGRICULTURAL GROUND. IT'S ALL NOW 
HARDTOP. WATERS RECEIVED GOING INTO THE GROUND NOW GOES INTO 
STORM DRAINS AS THE MAP SHOWS, COMES THROUGH HERE, AND STOP AT 
CATCH BASINS THAT DON'T HOLD IT AND IT FLOODS ON CRABTREES' 
PROPERTY. MR. CRABTREE'S GOING TO TESTIFY ABOUT THREE FLOODS, 
108 
TWO THAT WERE CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE RAIN IN THE PAST AND THAT --
THAT AND THAT THE -- THAT BY PUTTING THIS ASPHALT, TAKING THIS 
PROPERTY HERE, PUTTING IT THAT WAY, THERE IS A LOT MORE WATER 
THAT KEEPS COMING SO WHEN WE START GETTING WET WEATHER AGAIN, 
IT'S GOING TO KEEP FLOODING. THE PURPOSE OF ALL OF THIS IS TO 
SHOW WHAT THEY'VE CONSTRUCTED THERE, CONSTRUCTED THOSE STORM 
SEWERS, THEY'RE TOTALLY WITHIN THE CITY'S CONTROL. 
THE COURT: DOES THAT HELP YOU, MR. HINTZE? 
MR. HINTZE: HELPS ME UNDERSTAND WHAT HIS ARGUMENT 
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101 IS, BUT IT DOESN'T SOLVE THE PROBLEM AND THAT IS, THAT IT'S 
TOTALLY IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL IN THIS CASE AND TOTALLY --
IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR, THE — THERE'S A COUNTERCLAIM IN THIS 
CASE. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT WE'RE JUST REFERRING TO 
IN THIS HEARING. THERE'S NO SUCH CLAIM PLED. 
NUMBER TWO, IN ORDER TO ASSERT SUCH A CLAIM, IN OTHER 
WORDS, IF THERE IS SOMETHING THAT ARISES BY PAVING OF THIS 
PARTICULAR ROADWAY AND DAMAGE ARISES TO CRABTREES' PROPERTY 
FROM THAT, IT CAN BE ASSERTED BY WAY OF COMPENSATION IN THIS 
LAWSUIT. BUT IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE PAVING OF A 
DEVELOPMENT OVER HERE BY SOMEBODY AND A PAVING OF SOMETHING 
OVER HERE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A STORM DRAIN UP IN HERE THAT 
HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE EXTENSION OF 700 WEST, THEN WE'RE 
NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS LAWSUIT, FOR ONE THING. 
NUMBER TWO, IF THERE IS SUCH A CLAIM, THEN CRABTREE IS 
251 REQUIRED UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY STATUTE TO FILE THAT 
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CLAIM WITH THE CITY UNDER TITLE 63, POST A BOND, AND PROCEED 
UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. BUT THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT SPECIFICALLY RETAINS IMMUNITY FROM SUIT IN STORM 
FLOOD AND SEWER DRAINS. UNDER TITLE 63, 63-30-10, SUBDIVISION 
12 AND 14. SO I MEAN IT HAS NO BEARING WHATSOEVER. IT'S NOT 
PROPER IN THIS STATUTE. IT HAS NO RELEVANCY AND MATERIALITY 
TO THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE DAMAGES OCCASIONED BY THE 
WIDENING OF 700 WEST. 
MR. HUGHES: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. THE 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, QUOTING THE STATUTE HE'S 
REFERRING TO TALKS ABOUT SEVERANCE DAMAGES, THAT YOU CAN 
ASSESS ALL OF THOSE SEVERANCE DAMAGES, EVIDENCE AS TO 
DRAINAGE, DAMAGE WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE HIGHWAY AND CULVERT SYSTEM AND DESIGNED BY THE UDOT 
CERTAINLY FALLS WITHIN THIS SECTION. AN ENTITY GRANTED THE 
RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN CANNOT DESIGN THIS PROJECT WITHOUT 
REGARD TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PROJECT WOULD HAVE UPON ADJACENT 
LAND AS TO THE COMPENSATION. THE VERY PURPOSE --
THE COURT: THERE OBVIOUSLY IS AN ISSUE BETWEEN BOTH 
OF YOU. WHY WASN'T THIS, YOU KNOW, SUBMITTED TO ME ON A TRIAL 
BRIEF SO THAT I CAN BE APPRIZED OF THIS AND THUS MAKE A TIMELY 
MOTION? WHAT YOU'RE REALLY ASKING ME TO DO IS CALL A RECESS 
AND SIT DOWN AND READ THESE CASES AND EVALUATE THE MERITS OF 
THIS MATTER BEFORE I CAN RULE ON THE MOTION. 
MR. HINTZE: I'LL ANSWER THAT FROM MY STANDPOINT, 
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lj YOUR HONOR, AND THAT IS, I ASKED BY INTERROGATORY AND REQUEST 
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FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FOR THE INFORMATION THAT'S GOING 
TO BE PRESENTED BY THESE PEOPLE AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME 
I'VE EVER SEEN IT. IF I HAD KNOWN THIS WAS COMING, I WOULD 
HAVE ADDRESSED THAT ISSUE BY A MOTION. I NEVER SAW THAT 
SURVEY UNTIL THIS MORNING. 
MR. HUGHES: WE HAVE EXTENDED — - WE'VE SENT 
EXTENSIVE OFFERS OUTLINING THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE, INCLUDING 
WATER DAMAGES, WE SENT THOSE OUT --
MR. HINTZE: YOUR HONOR, NO, COUNSEL, YOU HAVE NOT. 
Ill YOU HAVE NOT PRODUCED FOR ME ANY DOCUMENTS UNTIL A WEEK AGO 
121 WHEN YOU SENT ME MR. JOHNSON'S APPRAISAL. I HAVE NEVER HEARD 
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OF THIS MAN UNTIL I GOT YOUR WITNESS LIST LAST FRIDAY. 
MR. HUGHES: ON THESE PARTICULAR TYPE OF SETTLEMENT 
OFFERS, WE'RE NOT JUST CLAIMING DAMAGE FOR WATER. I MEAN 
THAT'S — THAT'S NOT A NEW ISSUE, THAT'S NOT SURPRISE, THAT 
WATER CLAIM, THAT THIS PLACE GETS FLOODED. WE'VE BEEN IN 
FRONT OF THE CITY COUNCIL MAKING THAT SAME DEMAND, I DON'T 
KNOW HOW MANY, FIVE OR SIX TIMES ALREADY. THIS ISN'T A 
SURPRISE THAT WE'RE CLAIMING THAT THIS IS DAMAGE SEVERANCE — 
PART OF THE SEVERANCE DAMAGE. I MEAN THE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR 
IT. IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT CATCHES THEM OFF GUARD. 
THE COURT: MR. HUGHES, BE KIND ENOUGH AGAIN PLEASE 
TO STEP TO THE BOARD AND EXPLAIN TO ME WHY YOU BELIEVE THAT 
THIS IS RELEVANT. 
Ill 
MR. HUGHES: ALL RIGHT. QUITE BASICALLY, THE CITY 
HAS DESIGNED THE STORM SYSTEM AS PART OF THIS TAKING OF THIS 
PIECE OF GROUND. THE CONTRACT WE'RE GOING TO PUT IN, AND I --
IF WE HAVE TO PUT MR. HOLMES BACK ON, WE'LL DO THAT — THAT HE 
EXECUTED WITH THE OWNERS OF THIS PROPERTY ALLOWED THEM TO 
BUILD DUSTY'S DEALERSHIP, WAS PUT A STORM DRAIN THROUGH HERE 
DUMPING IT INTO THIS CULVERT. THE WAY THAT WAS DESIGNED 
ACCORDING TO WHAT MR. MOORE WAS JUST TELLING US DOESN'T DUMP 
THE WATER INTO THE RIVER. ON HIGHER WATER SEASONS WITH LOTS 
OF RAIN, IT DUMPS THE WATER IN CRABTREES' BUSINESS. AND 
THAT'S HAPPENED ON TWO PRIOR OCCASIONS. AND BECAUSE THEY'RE 
INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF WATER, BECAUSE OF THIS STORM DRAIN, 
AND THAT'S THE MAJOR PART OF WHY THIS PIECE OF GROUND WAS 
TAKEN. THAT'S WHAT THEY PUT RIGHT THROUGH HERE IS THE STORM 
DRAIN, IS THROUGH THAT 66-FOOT PARCEL. AND LIKE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS SAYS, IF THEY'RE GOING TO DESIGN IT AND SAY THAT WE 
HAVE TO GO THROUGH SOME OTHER ROUTE AND NOT CONSIDER IT AS 
PART OF THE DAMAGE HERE, WOULD DENY THE COMPENSATION ACT FOR 
SEVERANCE BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT IT DOES. 
THE COURT: SO YOU'RE BASICALLY SAYING THAT THE 
STORM DRAIN GOES THROUGH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND IF IT'S 
TAKEN, THEN A STORM DRAIN IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE MOVED. 
MR. HUGHES: OR INCREASED IN SIZE. OR ELSE PAY THE 
DAMAGES FOR THE FLOODING THAT GOES ACROSS HERE AND OBVIOUSLY 
THAT'S — 
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THE COURT: WHY WOULDN'T JUST THE CITY'S TAKING OF 
THAT PROPERTY, WHY WOULD IT DISTURB THE STORM DRAIN? 
MR. HUGHES: WELL, THEY PUT THE STORM DRAIN IN. 
THERE WAS NO STORM DRAIN HERE CONNECTED TO DUSTY'S BEFORE — 
THE COURT: I SEE. 
MR. HUGHES: WHEN THEY PUT THAT ROAD IN, THEY PUT THE 
STORM DRAIN IN, NONE OF THIS PROPERTY HAD ANY DRAIN BEFORE. 
SO THEY'VE BURDENED ALL OF THIS PROPERTY ADJACENT TO IT WITH 
THE FLOODING BY PUTTING THE STORM DRAIN THROUGH HERE. AND MY 
POINT WITH THE ELEVATION IS TO SHOW THAT THAT FORCES THAT 
WATER INTO THE CATCH BASINS. 
THE COURT: HERE'S WHAT I'M GOING TO DO, I'M GOING 
TO TAKE YOUR MOTION UNDER ADVISEMENT, MR. HINTZE. I'D LIKE TO 
READ THE CASE, IF YOU'LL PROVIDE ME A COPY OF IT. 
MR. HINTZE: I'LL DO THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. HUGHES: I THINK I'M DONE WITH MR. MOORE. THINK 
THE ITEMS OF TESTIMONY, RATHER THAN HAVE HIM GO THROUGH EACH 
AND READ EACH ELEVATION THERE, THEY ARE PRINTED ON THERE AND 
THE LOWER ONES ARE THE FARTHER DOWN. THE HIGHER NUMBERS ARE 
HIGHER UP, YOU MARKED — 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
MR. HUGHES: — IS THAT MARKED ELEVATION THERE — 
I MOVE ADMISSION OF THE EXHIBIT AS WELL. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. HINTZE: I OBJECT AS TO RELEVANCY. THE ELEVATION 
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MATTERS ARE THE FOOTAGES OF THE ROAD SHOWN ON THAT, SO HE'S 
NOT -- IT'S NOT GOING TO ASSIST US AT ALL AS TO TELLING US 
WHAT — HOW WIDE THE ROAD ACTUALLY — 
MR. HUGHES: 44 --
THE WITNESS: NO, THERE'S NO DIMENSION ON THAT. I DO 
NOT REMEMBER THE EXACT MEASUREMENT. 
MR. HINTZE: I OBJECT TO THE RELEVANCY OF THAT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. YOUR OBJECTION'S NOTED. 
MR. HUGHES: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER OF HIM. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION TO THIS? OR ANY CROSS? 
GO AHEAD. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HINTZE: 
Q YEAH, THANK YOU. MR. MOORE, DID YOU MAKE ANY MEASUREMENT 
OF THE ACTUAL ROADWAY AS CONSTRUCTED BY RIVERDALE CITY? 
A 700 WEST? 
Q YES. I'M SORRY. 
A NO, I HAVE NOT. 
MR. HINTZE: OKAY. THAT'S ALL I HAVE. THANK YOU. 
MR. HUGHES: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER OF THIS WITNESS. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION TO THIS WITNESS BEING 
EXCUSED? 
MR. HUGHES: 
MR. HINTZE: 
THE COURT: 
I DON'T. 
NONE, YOUR HONOR. 
THANK YOU. 
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ll MR. HUGHES: CALL MILES CRABTREE. 
21 MILES CRABTREE, 
31 CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
41 WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
51 DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
6I BY MR. HUGHES: 
71 Q WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
81 A MILES DAHL CRABTREE. 
91 Q AND HOW ARE YOU RELATED TO CRABTREE AUTO? 
A I'M THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION, CRABTREE AUTO 
COMPANY. 
Q AND HOW LONG HAVE YOU BE SO EMPLOYED? 
A WITH CRABTREE AUTO? ALL MY LIFE, BUT OFFICIALLY I GUESS 
20 YEARS. 
Q OKAY. YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THE ZONING OF THE PARCELS OF 
GROUND WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT, AREN'T YOU? 
A YES. 
Q WAS THERE A TIME WHEN CRABTREE AUTO NEGOTIATED WITH 
RIVERDALE CITY FOR A SPECIFIC ZONE ALLOWING JUNK YARDS? 
A YES, THERE WAS. 
Q AND WAS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ALLOW 4600 TO GO 
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THROUGH TO THE CITY PROPERTY? 
A YES, IT WAS. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME THE LAST TIME ANYBODY FROM WEBER COUNTY 
HAS BEEN ALLOWED, IF YOU KNOW, TO OPEN UP A NEW SALVAGE YARD? 
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II MR. HINTZE: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. THERE'S NO BASIS 
21 OR FOUNDATION --
3J MR. HUGHES: Q LET ME JUST ASK HIM, YOU'RE FAMILIAR 
WITH THE COMPETITORS IN WEBER COUNTY, AREN'T YOU? 
51 A YES, I AM. 
61 Q AND YOU'VE WATCHED THOSE I GUESS OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS? 
71 A YES, I HAVE. 
8 Q AND OVER THOSE LAST 20 YEARS, CAN YOU TELL ME THE LAST 
91 TIME YOU'VE RECEIVED A NEW COMPETITOR TO OPEN A NEW LOT? 
10 A NOT A NEW LOT. THEY'VE BEEN ABLE TO PURCHASE PREVIOUS 
111 LOTS, THE NEAREST ONE IS -- THEY -- WELL --
121 Q WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME A NEW SPOT GOT OPENED UP? 
131 A OH, THAT WAS PROBABLY ABOUT 13, 14 YEARS AGO. I COULD 
141 JUST — 
Q WHICH LOT WAS THAT? 
A IT WAS D&B FOREIGN. 
171 Q THAT WAS THEIR MOVE FROM ROY TO OGDEN CITY? 
181 A WELL, IT WASN'T QUITE THAT WAY. THEY MOVED FROM ROY TO 
191 WEBER COUNTY AND COULDN'T GET ANNEXED OR COULDN'T GET ZONED TO 
201 HAVE THE SALVAGE YARD THERE, SO THEY GOT ANNEXED ALONG WITH 
211 ANOTHER MAJOR MANUFACTURER SO THEY COULD GET ZONING SO THEY 
221 COULD EXIST. 
231 Q BUT OTHER THAN THAT, YOU'RE AWARE OF NO NEW YARDS THAT 
241 HAVE OPENED ANYWHERE IN WEBER COUNTY IN THE LAST 13, 14 YEARS? 
251 A NOT AS A NEW PROPERTY. THEY'VE ALWAYS BEEN — THEY'VE 
I 
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II HAD TO BUY PREVIOUS PROPERTY THAT'S BEEN ZONED SO THEY COULD 
B 
2| EXIST. 
3 MR. HUGHES: THAT'S ALL I HAVE OF HIM, YOUR HONOR. 
4I MR. HINTZE: NO QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
51 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
61 MR. HUGHES: CALL DAHL CRABTREE. 
71 THE BAILIFF: SIR, YOU CAN JUST STAND RIGHT THERE AND 
81 BE SWORN, RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND PLEASE? 
91 DAHL CRABTREE, 
10| CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, 
111 WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
121 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
131 BY MR. HUGHES: 
14I Q WILL YOU STATE -- OH EXCUSE ME, GO AHEAD AND SIT DOWN. 
151 WILL YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
161 A DAHL CONRAD CRABTREE. 
171 Q WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE CRABTREE AUTO? 
18 A CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD. 
191 Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BE DOING THAT? 
20 A SINCE IT WAS INCORPORATED. 
211 Q HOW LONG HAS THAT BEEN? 
22 A 1951. 
23I Q OKAY. YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THE GROUND WE'RE TALKING 
241 ABOUT, AREN'T YOU? 
25 A YES. 
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THE COURT: I'M GOING TO SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. I 
THINK YOU NEED TO MAKE IT CLEARER FOR THE COURT HOW HE ARRIVES 
AT THAT FIGURE. 
MR. HUGHES: Q OKAY. CAN YOU TELL US HOW YOU 
ARRIVED AT THE FIGURE? 
A WELL, WE BOUGHT SOME SIGNS IN THE PAST. WE BOUGHT 
SIGNS -- EXCUSE ME, I GOT A FROG IN MY THROAT. 
Q DO YOU NEED A GLASS OF WATER? 
A JUST GOT SOME. 
Q OKAY. IS THIS BASED ON WHAT YOU -- WHAT IT COST TO 
REPLACE? 
A YES. WE TRIED TO GET A SIGN REPLACED ACROSS THE STREET 
FROM IT AND THE BID WAS OVER $10,000. 
Q OKAY. SO THE --
A TO TAKE THE PLACE OF IT. 
Q SO THE NEW ONE WOULD COST 10,000? 
A WELL, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A BIGGER SIGN, BUT I DIDN'T HAVE 
THAT ONE APPRAISED, NO. 
Q BUT THAT'S THE VALUE YOU PLACED ON IT, THE $3,500 THAT'S 
YOUR VALUE? 
A YES, YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, ON THESE — YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THE TWO 
PARCELS OF GROUND ON THE EAST AND WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD, IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
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II Q OKAY. TELL US HOW THAT HAPPENED. 
2I A WELL, IT'S A LONG STORY. 
3I Q KEEP IT SHORT, GIVE US THE SHORT VERSION, TELL US WHAT 
41 HAPPENED. 
5 J A WE HAD PARKED CARS ON HERE IN 1989 AND THEY THREATENED US 
61 WITH ARREST IF WE DON'T GET THEM OFF --
71 MR. HINTZE: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. THAT'S 
81 UNRESPONSIVE TO THE QUESTION. THE QUESTION WAS, DID HE USE 
9I THAT AS A SALVAGE YARD RATHER THAN A PARKING LOT, AND IF SO, 
101 WHEN. 
Ill A WE PARKED THESE CARS — 
121 MR. HUGHES: I ASKED HIM WHO STOPPED HIS USE, THAT'S 
13I WHAT I'M ASKING. 
141 MR. HINTZE: IF THAT'S THE QUESTION HE ASKED AND THE 
151 ANSWER HE GAVE — 
161 THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU REPHRASE YOUR QUESTION. 
171 MR. HUGHES: Q ALL RIGHT. WHAT WERE YOU USING --
18I YOU TOLD US THAT YOU PARKED CARS ON HERE. WHAT KIND OF CARS 
19I DID YOU PARK ON THERE? 
201 A THEY WERE SALVAGE VEHICLES. 
21I Q OKAY. AND WHO INFORMED YOU THAT YOU COULDN'T DO THAT? 
22I A A GIRL FROM THE — FROM THE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
23I MR. HINTZE: WELL, OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. IRRELEVANT 
24 AND IMMATERIAL TO THIS CASE. IT HAS NO BEARING ON THIS CASE. 
251 MAY HAVE A LOT OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE CITY, BUT I FAIL TO 
121 
SEE ANY RELEVANCY --
THE COURT: WHAT'S THE RELEVANCY? 
MR. HUGHES: THE RELEVANCY IS THAT FOR THE LAST FOUR 
YEARS THAT IN ADDITION TO IMPACTING THE TWO PARCELS BY WHAT 
LEGALLY CAN BE DONE, THEY'VE ALSO STOPPED ACTUAL USE OF THE 
PROPERTY. THEY'VE STOPPED IT AS BEING ABLE TO BE USED FOR A 
SALVAGE OPERATION. PHYSICALLY STOPPED IT BY THREATENING 
ARREST. AND I THINK THAT WE'RE ENTITLED TO -- THAT MEANS THAT 
THE PROPERTY CAN'T BE USED AND WE -- AND SO THE TAKING IS MUCH 
MORE THAN JUST THE 66-FOOT TAKING. IT STOPS THE HIGHEST AND 
BEST USE OF --
THE COURT: ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE SEVERED 
PROPERTY OR ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE --
MR. HUGHES: I'M TALKING ABOUT THE ADJACENT PROPERTY. 
WELL, THE PROPERTY ON THE EAST AND WEST OF THE TAKEN PROPERTY, 
THOSE TWO STRIPS. 
MR. HINTZE: WELL, MY PROBLEM IS, YOUR HONOR, THERE 
IS NO COMPENSATION FOR BUSINESS LOSS IN THIS STATE IN 
CONDEMNATIONS. IT'S THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AND THE 
DIMINISHED VALUE OF THE SEVERED PROPERTY THAT IS COMPENSIBLE. 
THERE IS NO BUSINESS LOSS COMPENSATION IN THIS STATE. 
MR. HUGHES: WELL, WHAT'S HAPPENED IS THAT EVEN 
THOUGH THE ZONE ALLOWS FOR THIS SPECIFIC USE THAT THIS 
PARTICULAR PROPERTY WAS USED FOR DECADES, IT'S NOW BEEN 
STOPPED SINCE THE TAKING OF THIS MIDDLE STRIP AND THEY'RE NOT 
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11 JUST NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW AND THE ISSUE A LITTLE BETTER 
2I BEFORE I CAN RULE INTELLIGENTLY, SO WE'LL JUST UNDERSTAND THAT 
31 YOU HAVE A CONTINUING OBJECTION ON THIS WHOLE LINE OF 
41 EXAMINATION. 
51 MR. HINTZE: THANK YOU. THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE. 
61 MR. HUGHES: Q OKAY. HAVE YOU OBSERVED THAT? THE 
71 CAPACITY OF THOSE CATCH BASINS BEFORE THE STORM SEWER WAS 
8I ADDED? 
9I A WELL, THEY WOULDN'T -- YES, THERE'S THREE DIFFERENT 
10 TIMES. WELL, AT TWO DIFFERENT TIMES, BUT NOT THREE. THE 
111 FIRST WAS IN 1986, THAT WAS AFTER THE STORM SEWERS AT THE END 
121 OF THE CATCH BASINS WENT TO THE RIVER, AND WE HAD A FLOOD AT 
131 THAT TIME AND THE FLOOD WAS UP LEVEL WITH THE BOTTOM OF THE 
141 BRIDGE. IN FACT, JUST A LITTLE BIT HIGHER THAN THE BOTTOM OF 
151 THE BRIDGE. AND THE CATCH BASINS WERE ALLOWING THE -- THE 
161 CATCH BASINS WAS APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A QUARTER FEET BELOW 
171 WHAT THE WATER WAS. AND IT WAS ALLOWING THE WATER TO FLOW 
181 BACKWARDS THROUGH THE CATCH BASINS AND IT COMPLETELY UNINDATED 
19 j (SIC) THE ROAD IN THAT AREA AND FLOWED BACK INTO OUR BUILDING. 
201 Q WHAT WAS THE DEPTH OF THE WATER IN YOUR BUILDING? 
21I A APPROXIMATELY TWO INCHES. 
22I Q WHAT WERE THE DAMAGES YOU SUFFERED IN THE FLOOD? 
231 A SOME THIRTY-FIVE, FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WORTH OF 
24 DAMAGES. 
25I Q YOU SAY THIS HAS HAPPENED ON ONE OTHER OCCASION? 
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A IT HAPPENED ON ANOTHER OCCASION, YES. THAT CATCH BASINS 
ACTUALLY WOULDN'T TAKE THE WATER. NOW, WE WASN'T THERE, BUT 
IT HAPPENED ON A WEEKEND AND WE'RE -- THE BASIN HAS A PUMP 
STATION JUST OFF THE DUSTY PROPERTY OVER TO THE -- OVER TO --
TOWARDS THE RIVER. AND SOMEHOW THAT WEBER BASIN PIPELINE 
RUPTURED AND COME OVER INTO OUR WALL AND IT COULDN'T GET 
THROUGH THE WALL AND IT BUILT UP BEHIND THE WALL, THAT'S ON 
THE WEST AND NORTH AND SOUTH SIDE OF THE WALL, UNTIL IT BUILT 
UP TO WHERE IT GOT HEAVY ENOUGH THAT IT FORCED ITSELF 
UNDERNEATH THE WALL AND THEN IT COME DOWN INTO OUR BASIN THEN 
AND APPARENTLY THEY WERE TOO SMALL. THIS HAPPENED ON A 
WEEKEND AND I DIDN'T EVEN GET THE COURTESY OF HAVING THEM CALL 
ME ON IT. 
Q HAVE YOU HAD ANY OTHER NATURAL FLOODING OR THE ACTUAL ~ 
WHERE THE WATER FLOODED BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE RAIN OR EXCESS 
MOISTURE? 
A NOT SINCE THEM CATCH BASINS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED. 
Q DURING THE EIGHTIES, I THINK WE HEARD FROM MR. JOHNSON 
THAT YOUR OFFICIAL FLOOD PLAIN MAP, DURING THE -- ON THE EAST, 
HOW OFTEN OR HOW MANY TIMES DID THE WATER EXCEED THE BANKS OF 
THE RIVER THERE? 
A TWICE. 
Q IN THE 40 SOME ODD YEARS THAT YOU'VE OCCUPIED THAT 
GROUND, CAN YOU GIVE US SOME SORT OF AVERAGE OR FEELING OF 
WHAT YOU RECOGNIZE AS IT HAPPENS PER DECADE AS FAR AS FLOODING 
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OF THE RIVER OR EXCESSIVE WATER? 
A WELL, IN THE MAJOR FLOODING, THE MAJOR FLOODING PRIOR TO 
THAT WAS IN 1953 AND THAT UNINDATED ALL OF THAT PROPERTY 
THROUGH THERE. 
Q SO THE -- SO AVERAGING THAT OUT, THAT COMES OUT ABOUT 
ONCE A DECADE YOU'RE LOOKING AT THAT KIND OF FLOODING 
HAPPENING? 
A NATURAL FLOODING, THERE WAS THAT ONE, THEN THERE WAS ONE 
IN 48 AND ONE IN '53 AND THEN TWO IN THE EIGHTIES. 
Q ALL RIGHT. YOU ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT WITH THE CITY OF 
RIVERDALE FOR THE TRANSFER TO THEM OF PROPERTY THAT IS NOW 
KNOWN AS 4600 SOUTH, IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q AND I THINK THERE WAS A SERIES OF EXCHANGES OF LAND IN 
ORDER TO INDUCE YOU TO DO THAT, WASN'T THERE? 
A YES, THERE WAS. 
Q DID YOU RECEIVE A PIECE OF GROUND FOR THAT RIGHT OF WAY 
TO ALLOW THEM TO PUT THAT BRIDGE IN AND HAVE THAT ACCESS? 
A NOT — NOT FROM RIVERDALE CITY, I DIDN'T. 
Q WAS THERE A THIRD PARTY THAT WAS — WAS THIS A THREE-WAY 
TRANSACTION? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. WHO DID YOU RECEIVE THE ACTUAL PROPERTY FROM? 
A FROM MY SISTER-IN-LAW, ARLENE CRABTREE. 
Q IS THAT ONE OF THE LOTS ON 4600? 
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A IT'S THE PROPERTY, YES, IT'S THE PROPERTY ON THE NORTH 
SIDE OF 4600, RIGHT ABOUT WHERE — ABOUT WHERE THEY GOT 4600 
WRITTEN IN THERE. 
Q OKAY. IS THAT THE VALUE -- THE VALUE OF THAT KIND OF 
LOT, THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE CLAIMING YOU SHOULD BE RECEIVING FOR 
THE 700 WEST STRIP? 
MR. HINTZE: WELL, OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. THERE'S NO 
BASIS OR FOUNDATION FOR THIS MAN TO OPINE AS TO VALUES. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
MR. HUGHES: YOUR HONOR, MAYBE IF I COULD JUST --
THERE'S — THIS ISN'T A TYPICAL CASE WHERE THE CITY JUST HAS 
RANDOMLY COME IN AND SAID, OKAY, THERE'S -- THIS IS A PIECE OF 
GROUND WE WANT, WE NEED FOR A PUBLIC USE. THIS IS ONE THAT 
THEY HAD EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RIGHT OF WAY, AN OPENING 
OF A ROADWAY, THIS 4600 THAT DIDN'T EXIST BEFORE, AND AS PART 
OF THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERATION NEGOTIATED AND SHOWN AS THE 
VALUE OF THAT SINCE THE LOT CROSSED THE STREET, THIS 
PARTICULAR PIECE ON 700 WEST WAS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM 
THAT TRANSACTION. JUDGE HYDE HAS RULED ON PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE LANGUAGE IN THE CONTRACT WOULD 
APPEAR TO PREVENT THE CITY FROM USING ITS EMINENT DOMAIN 
RIGHTS, SAID, YOU KNOW, CAN'T GIVE THAT UP, BUT EVEN THOUGH 
THEY COULDN'T GIVE THAT UP AND HAVE THE RIGHT OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN, WHERE THEY CONTRACTED OTHERWISE, THE VALUE OF THIS 
OTHER CONTRACT AT LEAST OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE 
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l| MR. HUGHES: I THINK IT DOES, TOO. I THINK, I'M NOT 
2I SURE. I'M NOT SURE WHERE THE UNDERLINING CAME FROM IN THAT 
31 PART OF THE ORIGINAL. 
THE COURT: I'LL JUST MAKE A NOTE THAT I'LL READ IT. 
MR. HUGHES: ALL RIGHT. THAT WOULD BE THE EXTENT OF 
WHAT I WOULD HAVE OF HIM, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. HINTZE: MR. CRABTREE, -- WOULD YOU MARK THIS AS 
91 MY NEXT -- LET ME GIVE YOU ONE BEFORE THAT, IF I MAY. MARK 
10 
11 
12 
13 
THIS ONE PLEASE SEQUENTIALLY. MR. CRABTREE, LET ME -- WERE 
YOU DONE? 
MR. HUGHES: GO AHEAD. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
14I BY MR. HINTZE: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION 
PURPOSES AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 6. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THE AREA 
SHOWN IN THAT PHOTOGRAPH? 
A YES, UH-HUH. 
Q DOES THAT PHOTOGRAPH ACCURATELY DEPICT THE STREET 700 
WEST PRIOR TO THE TIME RIVERDALE CITY EXTENDED THE ROADWAY TO 
THE SOUTH? 
A THE STREET PRIOR TO THE TIME --
Q YEAH, BEFORE IT EXTENDED -- BEFORE THE WALL CAME DOWN AND 
THE ROADWAY EXTENDED SOUTH, IS THAT HOW THAT STREET LOOKED 
WITH YOUR FENCE — 
149 
USE OF THE PROPERTY? 
A NOT THE DEFINITION, BUT THE APPRAISAL REQUIRES A HIGHEST 
AND BEST USE, YES, SIR. 
Q ALL RIGHT. SO DID YOU FIRST, IN DETERMINING THE FAIR 
MARKET VALUE, MAKE AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE HIGHEST AND BEST 
USE OF THE PROPERTY? 
A I DID. 
Q AND WHAT EFFORTS DID YOU GO ABOUT TO MAKE THAT 
DETERMINATION? 
A WELL, I CHECKED THE ZONING, WHICH IS NOT ALWAYS -- WHICH 
DOES NOT ALWAYS DETERMINE HIGHEST AND BEST USE, BUT IT'S 
NECESSARY FOR A SPECIFIC USE TO BE ACCOMMODATED. YOU 
DETERMINE THE SIZE, WHAT THE DEMAND WOULD BE. WHAT THE MOST 
LIKELY USE WOULD BE, WHAT THE MOST -- WHO THE MOST LIKELY USER 
WOULD BE. SOMETIMES THAT'S EASIER SAID THAN DONE, BUT YOU 
COME UP WITH AN OPINION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE. 
Q OKAY. AND WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION AS TO THE HIGHEST AND 
BEST USE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BEING ACQUIRED AS OF 1988 AND 
FALL OF 1988? 
A ON THE DAY THAT I APPRAISED, WHICH WAS OCTOBER 1988, IT 
WAS ZONED MANUFACTURING, M-l. IN TALKING TO THE PLANNING 
BOARD, THEY INDICATED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE REZONED TO A 
COMMERCIAL ZONE. NO GUARANTEE, BUT CONSIDERING THAT THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT A COMMERCIAL ZONE MIGHT COME ABOUT, I USED 
THAT ZONE FOR LAND COMPARABLES. 
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l| INCREASES IN VALUE FOR OUR COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES IN THAT 
2I LOCATION. I THINK THAT OUR VALUES WERE SOMEWHAT DORMANT 
u 
31 WITHOUT ANY AN APPRECIABLE INCREASES DURING THAT SPECIFIC 
4| PERIOD OF TIME. I THINK THAT SINCE THE '88 PERIOD, WE'VE HAD 
5I A -- QUITE A JUMP AS FAR AS ACTIVITY IS CONCERNED. ON BOTH 
61 SIDES OF THE WEBER RIVER BRIDGE. IT'S AN AREA THAT TODAY IS 
7I PROBABLY ONE OF THE STRONGEST AREAS IN WEBER COUNTY. 
8 Q OKAY. BUT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT BEFORE 7TH GOES IN AND --
9I A YES. 
10I Q -- THE EXTENSION OF THE ROADWAY? 
Ill A YES. 
121 Q BUT PRIOR TO THE TAKE TIME --
131 A PRIOR TO THIS TIME, I WOULD GIVE — I WOULD SAY THAT THE 
141 84 TO '88 PERIOD SHOWED VERY LIMITED INCREASES IF ANY 
15 INCREASES. 
161 Q ALL RIGHT. DID YOU DETERMINE, MR. FROERER, WHICH OF THE 
17I FIVE COMPARABLES YOU WEIGHED MORE HEAVILY THAN OTHERS AND 
18I DETERMINED THEM TO BE MORE COMPARABLE TO THE SUBJECT, ALL 
19I THINGS CONSIDERED? 
20I A I USED NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER FIVE TO FIRM MY OPINION UP. 
211 Q OKAY. AND WHY DID YOU PICK THOSE TWO? 
I 22 
23 
24 
25 
A BECAUSE THERE WERE NOT ANY BETTER ONES, THERE WERE NOT 
ANY SUPERIOR SALES. THE SUBJECT WAS A VERY, VERY TOUGH PARCEL 
TO OBTAIN A COMPARABLE ON. PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE DEPTH. 
IN MY OPINION, HIGHEST AND BEST USE, I'VE SAID THAT IT WOULD 
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ll A I USED $3 A SQUARE FOOT FOR FINAL ESTIMATE OF VALUE. 
21 Q AND IN YOUR OPINION, IS THAT THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OR WAS 
3I THAT THE FAIR MARKET VALUE ON A PER SQUARE FOOT BASIS OF THE 
41 PROPERTY BEING TAKEN IN OCTOBER OF 1988? 
51 A YES, SIR. 
6I Q AND THE SIZES OF THE PARCEL BEING TAKEN, YOU DETERMINED 
71 HOW? 
81 A WELL, BY THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION, 66.02 BY 50.02. 
9I Q AND THAT EQUATES OUT TO 3,302.32 SQUARE FEET, IS THAT 
101 CORRECT? 
Ill A YES, SIR. YES, SIR. 
121 Q AND YOU MULTIPLIED THAT BY THE $3 AND THEN YOU COME UP 
13I WITH A FIGURE OF $9,907. 
14 A YES. 
15 Q AND IN THE APPRAISAL BUSINESS IS IT CUSTOMARY TO ROUND 
161 THAT SINCE WE KNOW APPRAISAL IS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE? 
17 A YES. 
18 J Q WHAT DID YOU ROUND IT TO? 
191 A I ROUNDED IT TO 10,000. 
201 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, MR. FROERER, AT MY REQUEST, DID YOU 
21 
>2 
>3 
14 
!5 
ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT ANY PROPERTY THAT ABUTS 
THE PROPERTY BEING TAKEN AND PERHAPS OWNED BY THE CRABTREES 
INCURRED ANY DIMINUTION IN ITS VALUE AS A RESULT OF 700 WEST 
BEING EXTENDED OR EXTENDED AS A RESULT OF THE TAKE OF THIS 
PROPERTY? 
185 
CAN PUT ON THAT BECAUSE OF ZONING? 
A IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE LIMITED THE NUMBER OF BUYERS, YES. 
Q CRABTREES' PROPERTY, BY TAKING THAT CHUNK OUT, YOU'VE 
ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATED THE UTILITY OF THE WESTERN PORTION OF 
THE SALVAGE YARD. 
A. I THINK THAT YOUR UTILITY, I THINK THAT YOUR DEMAND WHICH 
IS AGAIN-PRETTY CLOSE TO UTILITY, I THINK THAT YOUR DEMAND 
AFTER THE TAKING FOR THE PARCEL EAST OF 700 WEST WOULD HAVE 
JUST AS MUCH DEMAND AFTER THE TAKING THAN BEFORE. PARCEL WEST 
OF 700 WEST HAS A VERY, VERY NARROW, VERY NARROW -- GOES DOWN 
TO 15 OR 20 FOOT WIDTH AT THE WEST END, THAT HAD A VERY 
LIMITED UTILITY TO BEGIN WITH AS FAR AS, YOU KNOW, AS I COULD 
SEE. 
Q DID IT GO DOWN? DOES IT GO DOWN IF YOU CAN NO LONGER USE 
IT? 
A WIDTH? 
Q NO, DOES THE VALUE GO DOWN IF YOU CAN NO LONGER USE IT 
FOR A SALVAGE BECAUSE ITS — BECAUSE ITS UTILITY IS ONE OF 
THOSE ITEMS YOU COULD HAVE USED IT FOR IS NO LONGER THERE. 
A I THINK IT WAS A MISERABLE SPOT FOR SALVAGE TO BEGIN 
WITH, THAT SMALLER PARCEL. I THINK THAT IT HAS THE SAME 
UTILITY ON BOTH SIDES AS BEFORE. FOR THE DEMAND FOR HIGHEST 
AND BEST USE. 
Q YOU'RE SAYING THAT'S SOMETHING BESIDES SALVAGE? 
A YES, I AM. 
